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AUTHORITY, IGNORANCE, AND
THE

GUILTY MIND

Stephen P. Garvey*
ABSTRACT
The criminal law holds an actor liable only if he acts with a guilty mind
(mens rea). But in what does a guilty mind consist? We tend nowadays to
regard the guilty mind as consisting in nothing more than the various
mental states necessary to prove that an actor committed this or that criminal offense. Knowing in what the guilty mind consists thus requires nothing
more than reading and interpreting the statute defining the crime. The
guilty mind, in other words, consists in whatever the state in the exercise of
its authority to define crimes says it consists.
I suggest we regard the guilty mind not simply as a result of the state's
exercise of its authority, but as a limit on the exercise of the state's authority
as well. My thesis is this: An actorpossesses a guilty mind if and only if he
freely chooses to p, where p-ing is contrary to the demands of the criminal
law, and where the actor's choice to y manifests-eitherin the choice itself,
or in the actor's failure to realize that p-ing is contrary to the demands of
the criminal law-a quality of will inconsistent with that of a law-abiding
citizen.
I. INTRODUCTION

OU'RE not guilty of a crime unless you committed it with a
"guilty mind," or mens rea. Actus non facit reum nisi mens rea.1
The act is not culpable unless the mind is guilty. Everyone knows
of Law, Cornell Law School. For helpful comments I thank participants
*Professor
at the Criminal Justice Colloquium held at the SMU Dedman School of Law and at the
gathering on Comparative Conversations on Causation and Culpability in the Criminal
Law held at the SUNY Buffalo Law School.
1. The phrase is usually traced to St. Augustine's Sermon 180 on perjury. See Saint
Augustine, Sermon 180, in 5 THE WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: A TRANSLATION FOR THE
21ST CENTURY, vr. III-SERMONS, 314, 315 (John E. Rotelle, O.S.A. ed., Edmund Hill,
O.P. trans., 1992):

Take another person; he thinks it's false, and swears to it as if it were trueand it so happens that it is true. For example, to help you understand: "Did it
rain in that place?" you ask someone, and he thinks it didn't, but it suits his
purpose to say "Yes, it did." But he thinks it didn't. You say to him, "Did it
really rain?" "Yes, really," and he swears it did; and in fact it did rain there,
but he doesn't know it, and thinks it didn't; he's a perjurer. What makes the
difference is how the word comes forth from the mind. The only thing that
makes a guilty tongue is a guilty mind.
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that. The problem is that no one really knows, or if they know, haven't
clearly said, in what the guilty mind consists.
Or maybe I'm wrong. According to one line of thought, the criminal
law, or at least our criminal law, doesn't really rely on or need an account
of mens rea. Talk of mens rea is the talk of a bygone time. Like any bad
habit, it may persist, as indeed it does, but we'd all be better off, so the
thinking goes, if we dispensed with such talk. Today's criminal law relies
on, and has no need for anything more than, mentes reae, which are nothing more, and nothing more mysterious, than the various mental states
that the state happens to have decided it must prove in order to convict
an actor of this or that crime. 2 Talk of mens rea is thus not only elusive
and confusing, it's unnecessary. The criminal law gets on just fine without
it. So let's stop talking about it.
But this move won't do for my purposes. We should continue to think
about the guilty mind as mentes reae, but not only as mentes reae. The
modern move from guilty mind as mens rea to guilty mind as mentes reae
treats the guilty mind as something subject to state authority. The state
gets to decide what makes for a guilty mind when it defines the mentalstate elements of a crime, and indeed it should get to decide, as long as it
has the authority to do so. But any authority is subject to limits, and the
guilty mind as mens rea is one such limit. No state can legitimately punish
an actor unless he committed a crime with mens rea. Actus non facit reum
nisi mens rea.
So what does it mean to say that an actor committed a crime with a
guilty mind (mens rea) understood as a limit on a state's authority to
subject those under its authority to punishment? The guilty mind in this
older-fashioned sense is commonly said to consist in an "evil-meaning
mind," a "general immorality of motive," a "general notion of moral

2. See, e.g., 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
95 (1883) ("The truth is that the maxim about 'mens rea' means no more than
that the definition of all or nearly all crimes contains not only an outward and visible
element, but a mental element, varying according to the different nature of different
crimes."); Francis Bowes Sayre, The Present Signification of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law,
in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 399, 404 (Roscoe Pound ed., 1934) ("An intelligent understanding of the various states of mind requisite for criminality can be gained only through
an intensive study of the substantive law covering each separate group. The old conception
of mens rea must be discarded, and in its place substituted the new conception of mentes
reae.").
The distinction I draw between mens rea and mentes reae is sometimes described as the
distinction between culpability and elemental accounts of mens rea, or normative and descriptive accounts, or broad and narrow accounts. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.02, at 118-19 (6th ed. 2012); GEORGE FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw § 6.2, at 398-99 (1978); Douglas Husak, "Broad" Culpability
and the Retributivist Dream, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 449, 454-59 (2012). The vexing distinction between general-intent offenses and specific-intent offenses can be seen historically as
a step between the guilty mind as mens rea and the modern conception of the guilty mind
as mentes reae. See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILl, CRIMINAL LAw § 4.1.1, at
154-55 (2d ed. 2012). The specific intent-general intent distinction is unimportant for my
purposes.
ENGLAND
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blameworthiness," or as Blackstone put it, a "vicious will." 3 But to what
do such abstract expressions really amount? They seem to do little more
than let the blind lead the blind, substituting one black-box expression
("mens rea") for another ("evil-meaning mind," "vicious will," and such).
When the guilty mind functions to limit the state's authority to condemn
and punish, we should try hard to figure out more precisely in what the
guilty mind consists, lest a supposed limit on the state's power to punish
turns out in the end to be little, if anything, more than an unlimited license to punish.
In what follows I try to say as clearly as I can in what the guilty mind as
a normative limit on the state's authority to punish consists. Stated as
succinctly as I can, my thesis is this: An actor possesses a guilty mind if
and only if he freely chooses to 9, 4 where p-ing is contrary to the demands
of the criminal law,5 and where the actor's choice to Pmanifests a quality
of will inconsistent with that of a law-abiding citizen.6 Unless an actor
freely decides to T with a guilty mind the state cannot legitimately find
3. DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 10.02[B], at 118. Characterizing the guilty mind as, or as
reflecting or expressing, a "vicious" will is apt to sound odd to modern ears, but I hope to
explain the sense in which the guilty mind can loosely be said to reflect an ill will, or
perhaps even a vicious will, where "vicious" refers to a quality of will that reflects, not a
particular vice, but the lack of a particular virtue, i.e., law-abidance, and nothing necessarily more sinister.
4. For present purposes p can include acts, omissions, or intentions. If P is an omission, the statement of my thesis should be modified in relevant part to say that the actor
freely chooses to not-(p. When I say that an actor chooses to (p,I mean that he exercises his
will's capacity to produce p. See, e.g., ALFRED R. MELE, MOTIVATION AND AGENCY
197-214 (2003). I recognize that "intentions are often passively acquired; that is, they are
often acquired independently of an action (like deciding) of intention formation. . . . The
requirements for deciding are stronger than those for intending." ALFRED R. MELE,
SPRINGS OF ACTION: UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONAL BEHAVIOR 231 (1992).
5. When I say the "demands of the criminal law," I mean any obligation, which if
breached with a guilty mind, renders one criminally liable. That which is contrary to the
demands of the criminal law, whether an action, omission, or intention, is a wrong.
6. I use the term "manifest" interchangeably with cognate expressions, such as "express" or "reflect," though one might stipulate different meanings for each such term. See,
e.g., Neil Levy, Expressing Who We Are: Moral Responsibility and Awareness of Our Reasons for Action, 52 ANALYTIC PHIL. 243, 248 (2011) (distinguishing between an act "expressing, reflecting, and matching an attitude"). The phrase "quality of will" is perhaps most
famously associated with Strawson's use of it in Freedom and Resentment. See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 187 (1962). Frankfurt uses the term
"will" in a similar manner. See Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of
a Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1971). When I refer to an actor's quality of will, I mean to
distinguish it from his character, which is an actor's relatively stable or enduring quality of
will over time. Moreover, the term "will" in the phrase "quality of will" refers not to the
actor's executive capacity, i.e., the capacity to form intentions and volitions, but rather to
what (apparently) medieval philosophers described as a "rational appetitive faculty," understood as "a more or less rational appetitive or conative faculty whose functions include
desiring ... as well as the initiation of voluntary motion." Robert Merrihew Adams, Involuntary Sins, 94 PHIL. REV. 3, 6 (1985). For a more elaborate description of Aquinas on the
matter, see David Gallagher, Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite, 29 J. HIsT.
PHIL. 559 (1991). Holly Smith describes what I'm calling an actor's "quality of will" as the
"overall configuration of [an actor's] motives (including their relative strengths)." Holly M.
Smith, Non-Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance, 5 CRim. L. & PHIL. 115, 129 (2011). For a
helpful discussion on, and clarification of, the meaning of the phrase "quality of will," see
MICHAEL McKENNA, CONVERSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 57-64 (2012).
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him guilty of criminal wrongdoing. Absent such a finding, the state has no
permission to subject him to the criminal law's repertoire of responses,
not the least of which is punishment.
An actor whose choice to p manifests a quality of will inconsistent with
that of a law-abiding citizen is one whose choice manifests ill will toward,
or at least insufficient concern or regard for, the law and its ends. An
actor can manifest such a quality of will in two different ways. First, an
actor who forms an intent to p expresses ill will for the law if he wants to
p and forms the intent to p believing all the while that the law prohibits
the formation of such an intent. The mind of such an actor is guilty because it manifests ill will in the actor's decision to defy a demand he
knows the law has placed upon him. 7 He defies the law's authority inasmuch as he chooses to pursue ends, realizing that in so doing, he exceeds
limits the law has placed upon everyone subject to its authority, including
him.
But what if the actor chooses to 9 without realizing that the law prohibits his choice? What if he believes the law permits him to so choose, or at
least doesn't believe it prohibits his choice? Does his ignorance render his
mind guilt-free? We all know how the law itself would (more often than
not) answer that question: No! Ignorance of the law is no excuse. Better
luck next time.
I disagree. When an actor's ignorance of the law stops us from attributing to him a guilty mind, such ignorance does excuse, and ignorance often
does stop us from attributing a guilty mind. Often, but not always. Sometimes an actor's ignorance itself can manifest a quality of will constitutive
of a guilty mind: a quality of will no law-abiding citizen would ever dream
of having. If so, then the exculpatory force his ignorance would otherwise
have had disappears. His mind is guilty, not because he defies the law, but
because he is indifferent to it.
My concern here is to describe in what the guilty mind consists when it
assumes the form of indifference. I leave for another occasion the effort
to describe in what the guilty mind consists when it assumes the form of
defiance. My discussion proceeds in three steps.
Because my account of the guilty mind presupposes a state endowed
with a special-some say magical-moral power (namely, the moral
power or capacity to alter the moral status of those subject to its authority), the first step (Part I) is to explain how a state comes to be endowed
with such power and to describe in what its power consists. No state's
authority is without limit." One such limit disables a state from rendering
See

7.
JEAN HAMPTON, Mens Rea, in THE INTRINSIC WORTH OF PERSONS: CONTRACTARIANISM IN MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 72, 102-06 (Daniel Farnham ed.,
2007) (describing a "defiance conception" of culpability or mens rea).
8. Because, as I suggest below, only a democratic state can possess legitimate authority, my claim that such authority is subject to limits amounts to the claim that limits exist on
the exercise of democratic authority. See THOMAS CHRISTIANO, THE CONSTITUTION OF
EQUALITY: DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND ITS LIMITS ch. 7 (2008). For a well-known and

hard-to-dismiss argument to the effect that any such limits will themselves be subject to
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criminally liable those who choose to (pbut who do so without a guilty
mind. 9 A legitimate state has permission to punish those who choose to P
with a guilty mind, but enjoys no such permission with respect to those
who choose to p without a guilty mind. Those without guilt retain their
immunity to such treatment.
The second step (Part II) is to explain what I mean when I say that an
actor is ignorant or unaware of the fact that his choice to p is criminal,
which I'll hereafter abbreviate as ignorance or unawareness of the fact
that p, where p stand for that fact that p-ing constitutes a crime. Ignorance is a matter of degree, and the aim of the second step is to identify,
as clearly as I can, at what point we can fairly say that an actor was ignorant of the fact that his choice to <p crossed the line into crime.10 The last
step (Part III) is to explain how and why an actor who is ignorant of the
fact that p can nonetheless sometimes choose to T with a guilty mind.
Before proceeding I should emphasize once again that the guilty mind,
as I shall render it, is a limit on the exercise of state authority. I mean to
describe the state of mind without which an actor who commits a criminal
wrong cannot legitimately be subject to the responses associated with the
criminal law. A state is of course free to require more before it will give
itself permission to resort to such responses. Perhaps, for example, a state
will give itself permission to punish an actor only if he was aware of each
of the material elements constituting the crime with which he has been
charged, thereby rejecting any use of strict liability in its definition of
criminal offenses. Indeed, a just and wise state might do precisely that.
But a legitimate state is not obliged to do more, and if it declines to do
more, it doesn't thereby lose its claim to legitimacy."
II. AUTHORITY
Most contemporary criminal-law theorists assume, it seems safe to say,
that no state can, or at least no state does, possess authority, which means
reasonable disagreement and thus properly resolved through a democratic process, see
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT

302-12 (1999).

9. In addition to the requirement of a guilty mind, democratic states labor under at
least two other limits on their power to punish. First, a democratic state cannot render
anyone liable to punishment for the exercise of rights commonly associated with, or perhaps constitutive of, liberal democracies. Second, a democratic state cannot, in the otherwise proper exercise of its permission to punish, impose grossly disproportionate
punishments.
10. In his discussion of "broad culpability," Husak argues that any theory of such culpability "must be able to conceptualize blame in shades of grey rather than simply in black
or white." Husak, supra note 2, at 450. 1 agree that "broad culpability" in the sense in
which Husak uses the term is a matter of degree. My goal here is to describe the circumstances under which an actor's mind can be said to be culpable or guilty at all. Reasonable
minds can and do disagree on what makes one actor who crosses that threshold more or
less culpable than another. Authoritatively settling those disagreements is properly left to
the democratic process.
11. I make no effort here to describe how, if at all, the account of the guilty mind and
its role as a limit on the exercise of state authority to render an actor criminally liable is
reflected or not in the law, and in particular the constitutional law, of this or that
jurisdiction.
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that no one has a moral obligation, not even a prima facie one, to obey
the state. 12 Most contemporary criminal-law theorists therefore understand their job to entail telling the state what its criminal law should look
like, and thus telling the state what conditions should exist before it can
permissibly punish anyone. So understood, the job requires doing moral
theory because morality is the only authority to which anyone or anything, including the state, can or should submit. The state has no authority
of its own. Any authority it has piggybacks on the authority of morality.
I make the opposite assumption. I assume that a state can possess an
authority all its own, and thus that those subject to the state's authority
have a prima facie moral obligation to obey its law. Accordingly, I see the
criminal-law theorist's job (first and perhaps foremost, but not only) to be
about describing the limits on the state's authority to decide what its
criminal law should look like, and thus about describing the conditions
that must obtain before the state can permissibly punish anyone. The job
requires (first and perhaps foremost, but not only) doing political theory,
or perhaps second-order moral theory. I've elsewhere tried to explain in
more detail what I mean when I say that a state has authority, and moreover, what it would take for a state to have such authority.1 3 Here's a short
summary.
When we say that a state has authority, we usually have in mind one or
two possibilities. First, we might mean (only) that a state is morally permitted to threaten and sometimes use coercion in order to secure compliance with its demands. A legitimate state is one that can justifiably use
coercion to gain the obedience of its subjects. It can justifiably apply or
threaten to apply coercion against those who do or would disobey. Those
subject to such an authority are not obligated to obey. The state has no
power to impose moral obligations on them. Only morality has that
power. When the subject of such an authority disobeys, he therefore does
no wrong, or at least no wrong to the state, but neither does the state do
any wrong to him when it threatens him with some burden or hardship, or
visits such a burden or hardship on him if he disobeys.14
12. The assumption with which criminal law theorists begin is the conclusion to which
most contemporary political theorists argue. See, e.g., Matthew Noah Smith, Political Obligation and the Self, 86 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 347, 347 (2013) ("There may be

a consensus amongst moral and political philosophers that there is not today any existing
obligation to obey the law."). Perhaps the most prominent political theorist in the debate
has nonetheless recently detected a "backlash" against this consensus. See A. John Simmons, Democratic Authority and the Boundary Problem, 26 RATIO JURis 326, 330 (2013)

(describing a "kind of Kantian backlash against the skepticism about political authority
that was for a time an increasingly common feature of the recent literature on the
subject").
13. See Stephen P. Garvey, Was Ellen Wronged?, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 185 (2013). For

helpful summaries of the literature on political authority and political obligation, see, for
example, Tom Christiano, Authority, STANFORD

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

PHILOSOPHY, http://pla

to.stanford.edu/entries/authority (last updated Jan. 11, 2012); William A. Edmundson, State
of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAL THEORY 215 (2005); David Lefkowitz,
The Duty to Obey the Law, 1 PHIL. COMPASS 571 (2006).

14. For discussions defending or relying on an account of authority according to which
possessing authority neither conceptually nor normatively entails a correlative obligation
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Second, when we say that a state has authority, we might mean (more
strongly) not only that it can permissibly use coercion to back up its demands, but also that it has the power or capacity to change the normative
position of those subject to its authority, primarily, if not exclusively,
through the imposition of new moral obligations or the recognition of
existing ones. If a state has authority in this sense, then those subject to
that authority have a prima facie moral obligation to obey its demands.
An actor's culpable failure to obey constitutes culpable wrongdoing,
thereby rendering him liable not only to state coercion, but also to punishment, which combines coercion with censure. My account of the guilty
mind presupposes a state with authority in this second, stronger sense.15
A state exercises this authority, its power or capacity to impose new
moral obligations (or recognize preexisting ones), in a variety of ways to
give structure and content to its criminal law. It imposes obligations on
those subject to its authority to do this or refrain from doing that. It
grants permission to others (prosecutors) to call to account those who
they believe have culpably breached those obligations, and to others
(judges or juries) to decide if those called to account have indeed culpably breached those obligations. Last but not least, it imposes obligations
on some (judges) to censure through a judgment of conviction those who
have been found guilty of a culpable breach, and on others (prison officials) the obligation to inflict some hardship or impose some burden for
any such breach, thus transforming (mere) censure into punishment.
Many believe that no state can possess the normative power on which
my account of the guilty mind relies. How can any state create a moral
obligation ex nihilo, an obligation non-existent prior to the state's say-so?
Or even with respect to an obligation extant prior to the state's say-so,
how can the state's say-so suffice to transform that obligation into one
that runs to the state (in addition to the person to whom or entity to
which it would otherwise run)? It sounds like moral magic. Perhaps, but
think about the power of uncoerced consent or the power of promising.
on the part of those subject to the authority to obey its demands, see, for example, KENT
GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 53, 53 (1987); Arthur Isak Applbaum,
Legitimacy Without the Duty to Obey, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215, 222 (2010); Allen
Buchanan, Political Legitimacy and Democracy, 112 ETHIcs 689, 689-95 (2002); Patrick
Durning, Political Legitimacy and the Duty to Obey the Law, 33 CAN. J. PHIL. 373, 387
(2003); William A. Edmundson, Legitimate Authority Without PoliticalObligation, 17 LAW
& PHIL. 43, 44 (1998); Robert Ladenson, In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law, 9
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 134, 139-41 (1980); Rolf Sartorious, Political Authority and Political
Obligation,67 VA. L. REV. 3, 5 (1981); M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to
Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L.J. 950, 975 (1973); Christopher Heath Wellman, Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation, 111 ETHics 735, 741-42 (2001).
15. The nature of the obligation I have in mind is an obligation to conform, not to
comply. In other words, obedience to the law entails only conformity to the law; it may
(but need not) entail compliance. The state may claim that any obligation it imposes is an
obligation to comply, but the obligations it has the power actually to create lack that force.
Compliance means that the reason an actor p's is because the law says so. Conformity
means that the reason an actor 9's is because the law says so or for any other reason. See
Scott Hershovitz, The Authority of Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 65, 66-70 (Andrei Marmor ed., 2012).
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When I consent to a wrong, I thereby turn it (magically) into a nonwrong. When I promise to do something, I thereby (magically) create a
self-imposed obligation to do that which I have promised to do, where no
such obligation existed before. Both of these familiar moral powers have
limits, but so too does state authority. It should therefore be at least conceivable that some states are capable of performing the moral magic associated with the exercise of authority.
What kind of state might have such a capacity? What does it take for a
state to have the magical power associated with authority? I limit my answer to the state's authority over its criminal law. It may or may not extend to other departments of the law. My answer also comes in two parts.
I give one explanation for the state's authority to declare malum in se
wrongs to be crimes, and another for its authority to transform malum
prohibitum acts into wrongs and from there into crimes.16
Take malum in se crimes first. I regard malum in se crimes as wrongs
that, could they be committed with impunity, would threaten a return to
the state of nature, where the lives of all would be nasty, brutish, and
short. Such crimes are serious moral wrongs independent of whatever the
state says or does. What nonetheless happens when the state says that the
culpable commission of such a wrong is a crime (and will render one liable to punishment) is that the state thereby makes the obligation to refrain from such wrongdoing run not only to the immediate victim of the
crime (assuming one exists), but to the state itself. Authority's moral
magic works, not to render malum in se offenses wrongful in the first
place, but rather to render those who culpably commit them liable to
punishment at the hands of the state.
Having a state with the power to make itself in this way the victim of
malum in se offenses, i.e., having a state with authority, brings the power
of the state to bear in the effort to forestall the commission of such
crimes, through either the use or threated use of punishment. In other
words, the good we achieve when we leave the state of nature and enter a
state with the authority to punish malum in se wrongs is precisely to leave
the state of nature. Of course, any state, democratic or dictatorial, can
achieve this end, and thus, the authority of a state to render those subject
to its authority liable to punishment for the culpable commission of malum in se wrongs doesn't depend on the character of the state. It depends
on its ability to deliver the goods, and I'm bound to obey out of respect
for my fellow subjects because and insofar as they likewise obey, making
us all better off than we would be if we were to disobey and so return to
the state of nature.

16. The way in which I draw the distinction between the categories malum in se and
malum prohibitum is unconventional. Malum in se crimes consist in those acts that, if they
could be committed with impunity, would threaten a return to the state of nature. Malum
prohibitum crimes consist in those acts that, subject to certain limits, the state says are
crimes and nothing more. See Garvey, supra note 13, at 206.
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Next take malum prohibitum crimes. Some crimes commonly regarded
as malum prohibitum can of course be seen on closer inspection to be
moral wrongs. But not all. Some malum prohibitum crimes are moral
wrongs only because the state says so. Indeed, the state's say-so is precisely what makes them moral wrongs, and moreover, moral wrongs
against the state. Why would anyone want a state with that power? What
good could it do?
Let me suggest the following. Having a state with authority to declare
malum in se wrongs crimes, and thus render those who commit such
crimes vulnerable to state punishment, saves us from the perpetual insecurity of the state of nature. Likewise, having a state with authority to
transform non-wrongs into malum prohibitum crimes saves us from the
perpetual disagreement of what might be called a political state of nature.
We need some way to settle our disagreements about the scope of the
criminal law outside of its malum in se core.17 Indeed, we need a way to
settle our disagreements, not only about what should and should not be a
crime, i.e., not only about the specific part of the criminal law, but about
all the rules and doctrines that constitute the general part as well, not to
mention disagreements about when and how (within limits) the state
should exercise its power to punish.
The character of the state makes no difference to its authority to declare malum in se wrongs crimes, thereby rendering those who culpably
commit such wrongs liable to state punishment. Any state can rescue
those subject to its authority from the state of nature as long as it has the
institutional wherewithal to enforce its demands. In contrast, when it
comes to the state's authority to declare malum prohibitum acts crimes
(and thus transform them into wrongs) the character of the state makes
all the difference. Not just any old state will do. Only a well-functioning
democracy can have the authority to say that a non-wrong is a crime and
thereby render its culpable commission not only wrongful, but punishable. Any state can settle disagreements, but only a democratic state can
enjoy authority over its subjects because only in a democratic state is everyone entitled to have his say in settling disagreements over what the
rules of collective coexistence should be.' 8
17. I should add that even within what I'm calling the "malum in se core," disagreement will invariably arise over precisely how the offenses constituting that core should be
defined. The neat distinction I draw between the justification and legitimation of state
authority with respect to malum in se and malum prohibitum is thus not as neat as the text
implies. I thank Guyora Binder for this point.
18. For accounts of political authority based upon the democratic nature of the state,
see, for example, CHRISTIANO, supra note 8; DAVID ESTLUND, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY:
A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK (2008); ANNA STILz, LIBERAL LOYALTY: FREEDOM, OnLIGATION, AND THE STATE (2009); JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999);
Thomas Christiano, The Authority of Democracy, 12 J. POL. PHIL. 266 (2004); Scott Hershovitz, Legitimacy, Democracy, and Razian Authority, 9 LEGAL THEORY 201 (2003); Scott
Hershovitz, The Role ofAuthority, 11 PHILOSOPHERS' IMPRINT 1 (2011); David Lefkowitz,

A Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority, 18 RATIO JURIs 346 (2005); Scott J.
Shapiro, Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF

LAW (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). For criticism, see A. JOHN SIMMONS,
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Let me summarize. A state's authority with respect to malum in se
crimes is justified inasmuch as the exercise of that authority saves us from
the state of nature, and we are bound to obey inasmuch as obedience
shows due regard for the obedience and restraint of one's fellow subjects.
Any state capable of achieving this end thereby earns authority over malum in se crimes. A state's authority with respect to malum prohibitum
crimes, as well as the general part of the criminal law, is justified inasmuch as the exercise of that authority saves us from a political state of
nature in which disagreements over the content of the criminal law are
left perpetually unsettled. We are duty-bound to obey inasmuch as the
rules governing collective existence emerge from a process within which
your beliefs are accorded the same regard as mine, which means that only
a democratic state can earn authority over malum prohibitum crimes and
the general part of the criminal law.
III.

IGNORANCE

When we think about what it takes to render an actor criminally liable
we tend to have in mind some idea of freedom or control. Even when an
actor has committed a criminal wrong, he's not responsible or culpable
for his wrongdoing unless, for example, he freely committed the wrong,
his wrongdoing was in his control, he could have done otherwise, he acted
voluntarily, and so on. An actor doesn't shed his immunity from liability
unless what he did was done, we might say more generally, of his own
free will. Such freedom of the will is indeed necessary before we can
ascribe a guilty mind to an actor for any crime he commits. But freedom
isn't sufficient. We need something more.
What's needed is some realization on the actor's part that what he's
doing (or not) is something the law demand he do (or not) on pain of
censure or punishment. Take A and B, both of whom choose to (p,which
is a crime. A chooses to (pknowing full well that in so doing he renders
himself vulnerable to the force of the criminal law. B chooses to (P in
blissful ignorance. He has no inkling whatsoever that in choosing to p he
crosses the Rubicon into criminality. Now, a law-abiding citizen is, if anything, one who abides the law. A's choice to p thus manifests a quality of
will inconsistent with that of a law-abiding citizen. Such defiance is as
plain a manifestation of ill will as one could want. But what about B? If
A's knowledge manifests a guilty mind, does B's ignorance reveal its
absence?
B would get no break from the criminal law as we know it. With some
important exceptions,19 B's plea to retain his immunity to criminal liabilPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2008); A. John Simmons, DemocraticAuthority and the Boundary
Problem, 26 RATIO JURIs 326 (2013). I say nothing here about what a state must look like

or how it must work to be fairly characterized as a democratic state endowed thereby with
authority. I don't in any event mean to be saccharin about real-world democracies and how
they work.
19. One set of such exceptions (estoppel, lack of notice, and void for vagueness) involve cases in which the actor's ignorance can fairly be said to be due to some malfeasance
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ity based on his ignorance of the law will fall on deaf ears. Ignoratia legis
neminem excusat. Ignorance of the law does not excuse.
One sometimes hears that ignorance of the law is no excuse because
everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law, whether they really
do or not. But this supposed defense of the no-excuse maxim is no defense at all. On the contrary, it amounts to a confession that ignorance
does excuse. No one is actually excused only because the law blinds itself
to reality. Whenever an actor is ignorant of the law, he is, in the eyes of
the law, nonetheless presumed to have had knowledge of it. But that
won't do. It only shifts the question from why ignorance is no excuse to
why knowledge is conclusively presumed whenever an actor lacks it.
One sometimes hears too that ignorance is no excuse because everyone
has a duty to know the law. But this defense of the maxim carries no
conviction either. 20 One could imagine the state imposing on its citizens a
duty to know whether p-ing is unlawful. Yet no one who failed to discharge that duty should be criminally liable unless he failed to discharge it
with a guilty mind. So maybe the state imposes a duty on its citizens to
know whether they are violating their duty to know whether P-ing is unlawful. But no one who failed to discharge that duty should be criminally
liable unless he failed to discharge it with a guilty mind, and so on. Defenses of the no-maxim rule that appeal to conclusive presumptions and
imagined add-on duties are smoke and mirrors.
The standard defense of the no-excuse maxim relies on the supposed ill
consequences we would face if ignorance did excuse. Holmes thought the
no-excuse maxim was a good idea because it encouraged people to learn
what the law demanded of them, and the good thereby achieved was
worth the admitted injustice occasioned when the ignorant were convicted and punished. 2 1 Some defenders of the maxim go further and imagine an end to the rule of law itself if the law were to allow ignorant
criminals to escape their just deserts. The law would end up being
whatever the defendant believed it to be, and that couldn't be good for

or nonfeasance on the state's part. The other exception involves crimes to which the state
has decided to impose on itself the burden of proving that the actor realized he was committing a crime, commonly through the use of the mental-state term "willful." Existing law,
therefore, recognizes the exculpatory force of an actor's ignorance only when the state is at
fault or when the state, for whatever reason, chooses to recognize it. The only exception to
this generalization so far as I can tell are cases involving M'Naughten-style insanity, which
are perhaps so extreme that no state can with a straight face refuse to recognize the power
of ignorance to undermine the ascription of a guilty mind.
20. Douglas N. Husak, Ignorance of Law and Duties of Citizenship, 14 LEGAL STUD.
105, 107 (1994) (concluding that several arguments offered in defense of the ignoratiojuris
maxim that invoke an "alleged" duty to know the law are "unsound"); Douglas Husak,
Mistake of Law and Culpability, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 135, 137-38 (2010).
21. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 48-49 (1881). For a challenge to Holmes'
calculus, concluding that "if the goal were truly to maximize private knowledge of the law,
a negligence standard would be unambiguously superior to a strict liability standard," see
Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse-But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 127, 133 (1997).
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anyone. 22
It might turn out that the benefits of the maxim in the end outweigh its
costs, and conversely, that discarding it might well produce more costs
than benefits. Who really knows? Much depends on what counts as a cost
and what counts as a benefit, and on whether the rule actually produces
those costs and benefits. Maybe the calculus favors the maxim in some
cases (e.g., when the crime is malum in se and the actor did or should
have realized he was doing something morally, and therefore likely legally, wrong) but not in others (e.g., when the crime is malum prohibitum
and the actor didn't and had no reason to realize he was doing anything
morally, and therefore likely legally, wrong). 23 Maybe.
The standard defense suffers in any event from a deeper problem. A
democratic state is free to rely on whatever cost-benefit analysis it wishes
to rely on when deciding what its criminal law should look like, as long as
it doesn't surpass the limits of its authority. The requirement of a guilty
mind is one such limit, and as such, no state is free to ignore an actor's
ignorance when it undermines the ascription of a guilty mind. If ignorance is incompatible with a guilty mind, then ignorance excuses
whatever the consequences, and indeed, it seems to me that, all else being
equal, ignorance does excuse. 24
Our reactive emotions tend, all else being equal, to subside if we come
to believe that a wrongdoer (including a criminal wrongdoer) didn't realize he was doing wrong, 2 5 which is at least some evidence that ignorance
22. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 382-87 (1960). The
standing reply to Hall's worry is that he confused ignorance as a justification with ignorance as an excuse. If ignorance excuses, offenders don't get to say what the law is. All they
get is the chance to be excused for being unaware of what the law is.
23. One benefit of an ignorance defense would be to offset the costs arising from overcriminalization. For more on this point, see, for example, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., A Mistake of
Law Defense as a Remedy for Overcriminalization,CRIM. JUST., Spring 2013, at 10.
24. The parallel question in morality is whether an actor can be morally culpable for a
wrong he does if he is unaware of its deontic status as wrongful. For arguments to the effect
that non-culpable ignorance of the moral status of one's action renders one excused or
non-culpable for one's wrongdoing, see, for example, RONALD MILO, IMMORALITY 82

(1984) (An actor who "mistakenly believes (assumes) that what he does is right-either
that it is morally permissible or perhaps even that it is morally required . . . is sometimes
excus[ed] and sometimes not[,]" depending on whether his ignorance is itself culpable.);
MICHAEL J. ZIMMERMAN, LIVING WITH UNCERTAINTY: THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF IGNORANCE 177 (2008) ("[Llack of ignorance is a root requirement for responsibility.");

Gideon Rosen, Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 295, 307 (2004)

("[Elvery culpable bad action must be, if not itself a knowing sin .... then at least an act
whose etiology involves a knowing sin."). For a reply to Rosen, see William J. FitzPatrick,
Moral Responsibility and Normative Ignorance:Answering a New Skeptical Challenge, 118
ETHICs 589 (2008), and Matthew Talbert, Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral
Disagreement in Blame, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN AGENCY AND RESPONSIBILITY 225
(David Shoemaker ed., 2013).

25. Commentators are naturally most reluctant to contemplate the possibility that ignorance of the law will excuse an actor when the crime the actor commits is malum in se,
i.e., a moral wrong everyone would characterize as grave or serious. See, e.g., Gideon
Yaffe, Excusing Mistakes of Law, 9 PHILOSOPHERS' IMPRINT 1, 8 (2009) ("To say that

[someone who intentionally kills with full awareness of all the facts] also needs to believe
himself to be acting illegally if he's to be doing something deserving of punishment is to
elevate a reverence for the law beyond morally tolerable bounds."). First, such cases are
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has the power to excuse. Or maybe it would be more accurate to say that
the retreat of the reactive emotions in the face of ignorance is some evidence that ignorance does excuse in morality and should excuse in criminal law. Moreover, although the ignoratia maxim is the orthodoxy (at
least in Anglo-American criminal law), 26 it's always had its detractors.
Andrew Ashworth minces no words: The doctrine that ignorance of the
law is no defense is, he says, "preposterous." 2 7 Indeed, one might go so
far as to say that ignorance should always excuse, in both morality and
the criminal law (at least if it can't be traced back to a prior wrong or
crime committed with a guilty mind).
Perhaps, but I won't go that far. It seems to me on reflection that our
reactive emotions don't always retreat when we come to believe that a
criminal wrongdoer didn't realize he was committing a crime, even if we
assume the actor's ignorance can't be traced back to some prior culpable
wrongdoing. Our reactive emotions sometimes tend to persist despite the
realization that the actor never thought he was doing anything wrong.
Before explaining when ignorance does and does not undermine the
ascription of a guilty mind (in the next Part), I need first to be more
precise about what I mean when I say an actor is "ignorant" of the "law."
In what does his "ignorance" consist? Of what "law" must he be ignorant
before he can be said to lack a guilty mind?
Although I'll continue to speak in terms of an actor believing (or not),
or realizing (or not), or being aware (or not) that what he's doing is criminal, such terms are insufficiently precise to convey adequately what I
have in mind when I describe the cognitive state an actor must have toward the fact that his conduct amounts to a crime before he can be said to
28
have acted with a guilty mind. So let me be more precise.
Cognitive attitudes can vary along (at least) two dimensions. 29 First,
they can vary in the extent to which an actor has confidence in the truth
bound to be rare insofar as they invite us to imagine an actor who realizes that what he's
doing is seriously morally wrong but at the same time legally permissible. Second, for two
ways I currently see to deal with such cases see infra pp. 130-31.
26. New Jersey recognizes reasonable ignorance as a defense. See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:2-4(c)(3). So too (in one form or another) do Germany, Sweden, and South Africa.
See ANDREW ASHWORTH, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW 85-87 & n.32 (2013).
In none of these places does the rule of law seem to be in any jeopardy.
27. ASHWORTH, supra note 26, at 81.

28. A similar problem with precision infects the distinction between the mental-state
categories of recklessness and negligence. For efforts to render the distinction between
these two categories more precise, see, for example, Douglas Husak, Distractionand Negligence, in PRINCIPLES AND VALUES IN CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ANDREW ASHWORTH 81 (Lucia Zedner & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2012);

Douglas Husak, Negligence, Belief and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting,
5 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 199 (2011); Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd, Punishing the Awk-

ward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence, 5 CRIM. L. &
PHIL. 147 (2011).

29. These two dimensions exist along a continuum, but the law (for better or worse, or

perhaps necessarily) tends to deal in categories, not continua. See LEO KATZ, WHY THE
LAW IS So PERVERSE 181 (2011) ("The law splits hairs because it cannot do otherwise.").

For a discussion of other ways in which one cognitive attitude varies from another, see Eric
Schwitzgebel, Belief, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/
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of the proposition (p) constituting the content of the attitude. For example, when we say that an actor knew that p, we might mean to ascribe to
him a cognitive attitude toward the truth of p that he holds with considerable confidence. He knows that p, whether p is in fact true or false.30 In
contrast, if we say that he believed that p, we might mean thereby to
ascribe to him a cognitive attitude toward the truth of p that he holds
with comparatively less confidence, but nonetheless enough confidence to
warrant use of the term belief. Finally, if we say that he suspected that p,
we might mean thereby to ascribe to him a cognitive attitude toward the
truth of p that he holds with not much confidence at all, or at least less
confidence than it would take to say that he believes that p, let alone that
he knows that p.31
Second, cognitive attitudes can vary in terms of the extent to which the
actor is aware or conscious of the fact that he has the attitude he has. If
the attitude is present in the actor's mind at the relevant point in time, we
can say that the attitude is occurrent. The actor's mind is currently-then
and there-considering the proposition forming the content of the attitude. If the attitude is not present in the actor's mind at or during the
time of action, but could be summoned to mind with little or no effort, we
can say that the attitude is dispositional.32 Finally, if the attitude cannot
be summoned to the forefront of the actor's mind without some appreciable effort, we can say that the attitude resides in the actor's unconscious.
Unconscious beliefs can still influence what the actor (consciously) believes and does, but they exercise their influence off stage, so to speak.
Because my account of the guilty mind is meant to describe the threshold an actor must pass before losing his immunity to criminal liability, the
cognitive attitude I have in mind must be just enough to cross that threshold and no more. It seems to me that an actor who dispositionallysuspects
that he is committing a crime (which proposition I will hereafter call p)
possesses a cognitive attitude sufficient to ascribe to him a guilty mind,
and thus render him criminally liable. Such an actor has some sense that
he is committing a crime when he chooses to 9, even if that thought is not
passing through his mind at the moment. Conversely, an actor is ignorant
entries/belief (last updated Nov. 21, 2010) at § 2 ("Types, Degrees, and Relatives of
Belief").
30. I realize that insofar as "knowledge" is understood to mean justified true belief, no
one can be said to "know" a proposition if that proposition is in fact false.
31. Some actors who have no confidence in the truth of p might nonetheless hope that
p. I'll leave aside for now whether we can ascribe a guilty mind to an actor who hopes that
p (while neither knowing, believing, nor even suspecting that p). I also leave aside the
problem of specifying the requisite measure of suspicion in terms of beliefs about the
probability of the truth that p, i.e., how much suspicion is enough to warrant ascribing a
guilty mind? Perhaps the most one can say here is that a suspicion is enough to warrant the
ascription of a guilty mind if that suspicion would give pause to a law-abiding citizen.
32. One might also say that such an attitude is "personally available" to the actor. See
Neil Levy, The Importance of Awareness, 91 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 211, 214 (2013) (arguing that moral responsibility requires that the moral status of an actor's act be "personally
available" to the actor); Levy, supra note 6, at 246-47 ("Information is personally available
when it is so readily available that it requires little effort to retrieve it and it is poised to
guide behavior.").
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of the law if he has no cognitive attitude with respect to p, or some cognitive attitude not rising to the level of dispositional suspicion. For ease of
exposition, I will continue to speak in terms of what an actor believes or
not. Yet what I mean in so speaking is that an actor who chooses to <p
does so with a guilty mind if in so choosing, he at least dispositionally
suspects that p; otherwise, his mind (all else being equal) is guilt-free.
Let me now turn from the cognitive attitude needed for a guilty mind
to the content of that attitude. When we say that an actor is ignorant of
the law, what more precisely must he be ignorant of? What's the "law"
about which I'm talking? I'm not talking about the specific criminal statute the actor has been charged with violating. On the contrary, all it takes
for an actor to choose with a guilty mind is that he believe (i.e., dispositionally suspect) that he is committing a crime, even if the crime he believes he is committing is not one, or not the only one, he actually
commits. He chooses with a guilty mind when, having freely chosen to <p,
he believes he has done something to render himself criminally liable. An
actor who chooses to <p, believing that in so choosing he's crossing the line
into criminality, does so with a guilty mind, and in so doing, assumes the
risk that the crime he actually commits will be worse than the one he
believed he was committing. 33 Versari in re illicita.34
Sound harsh? Yes, I confess. Indeed, it sounds like I'm endorsing doctrines criminal-law theorists have roundly condemned, like the felonymurder rule and the so-called legal wrong doctrine. 35 Both doctrines infect the criminal law with strict liability. The felony-murder doctrine imposes murder liability if you kill someone while committing a felony, even
if you reasonably had no idea your conduct posed any risk to life. The
legal wrong doctrine imposes liability for an unwittingly-committed
greater crime if you wittingly commit a lesser crime included within it,
even if you reasonably had no idea of the fact or facts that transform your
lesser crime into the greater one, such as the victim's age or status.
The critics have my sympathy. If I were vested with the authority to
define crimes, I'd probably require (as does the Model Penal Code) proof
that an actor was at least reckless with respect to each of its material
33. For work discussing this principle, see, for example, JOHN GARDNER, Rationality
and the Rule of Law, in OFFENCES AND DEFENCES 40-41 (2007); JOHN GARDNER, Reply to
Critics, in OFFENCES & DEFENCES 239-80 (2007); Andrew Ashworth, A Change of Normative Position: Determining the Contours of Culpability in Criminal Law, 11 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 232 (2008); John Gardner, On the GeneralPart of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHY
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 204, 244 (Antony Duff ed., 1998); Jeremy Horder, A Critique of
the CorrespondencePrinciplein Criminal Law, 1995 CRIM. L. REV. 759, 764; Kenneth W.
Simons, Is Strict Criminal Liability in the Grading of Offences Consistent with Retributive
Desert?, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 445 (2012).
34. This doctrine apparently comes from canon law. See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens
Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present,
1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 705. Gardner states the maxim as versanti in re illicitaeimputantur
omnia guae sequntor ox delicto, which he translates as "one acting unlawfully is held responsible for all the consequences of his conduct." Id.
35. The natural-and-probable consequences doctrine associated with accomplice liability is another example. See DRESSLER, supra note 2, § 30.05[5], at 475-76.
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elements before being found guilty. But I don't have that authority. The
state does. The task at hand is to identify the line dividing those who act
with a guilty mind from those who don't, not to describe what I believe
the state should require by way of culpability for this or that offense once
that line has been crossed. The task is to describe in what the guilty mind
consists as a limit on state authority, not to describe in what it should
consist when the state exercises that authority.
Before moving on, consider an actor who believes that p-ing is morally
wrong, but is nonetheless confident that the law permits him to q, i.e., he
doesn't even suspect that q-ing is a crime. Secure in his belief that the law
permits him to p, he qp's. As it happens, he's mistaken. The criminal law
does prohibit p-ing. Our actor erroneously believes he has discovered a
loophole in the law, and he exploits it. Does he choose to p with a guilty
mind?
In the usual case one imagines that an actor who believes that .p-ing is
morally wrong will believe that p-ing is criminally prohibited as well. But
set the usual case aside. Assume we are dealing with a genuine loopholer.
I can see two possible answers to our question. One is to bite the bullet.
The loopholer ex hypoethsi doesn't even suspect that p-ing is criminally
wrong, and thus (all else being equal) he acts without a guilty mind when
he chooses to p. The loopholer defies morality, but he doesn't defy the
law. On the contrary, we can assume his efforts to learn what the law
prohibits and what it permits is scrupulous. Indeed, the prudent loopholer
needs to be scrupulous in his effort to learn the law, lest he make a mistake in pursuit of his unscrupulous ends.
But I can imagine another plausible line of reply that makes it harder
for the loopholer to escape the ascription of a guilty mind. I've said that
an actor chooses to p with a guilty mind if in so choosing he dispositionally suspects that 9-ing is a crime. The object of his cognitive attitude is p,
i.e., the fact that p-ing is a crime. But now imagine that the object of his
cognitive attitude is not the fact that p-ing is a crime, but rather p', i.e.,
the fact that the state, had it entertained whether or not to subject those
who p to criminal liability, would have done so. Our loopholer would
now be able to escape the ascription of a guilty mind only if at the moment he chooses to p he believes that tp-ing is morally wrong, and at the
same time doesn't even suspect that the state, had it thought about it,
would have made 9-ing a crime. I'd guess that few loopholers would fit
that description, and if so, then few would escape liability.
IV.

THE GUILTY MIND

When an actor is indeed ignorant of the fact that he's committing a
crime (i.e., ignorant of the fact that p), we should ask why? Why did he
fail to form the belief that p? The question needs to be asked because the
answer might reveal that the actor's ignorance is not exculpatory after all.
His ignorance might constitute a prima facie excuse forestalling the
ascription of a guilty mind, but if we dig deeper, we might discover that
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his ignorance is itself culpable. If we travel to the source of his ignorance,
we might find a guilty mind when we arrive.
Let me mention one possibility only to set it aside. I'm referring to the
idea that an actor who fails to form a belief, including the belief that p, is
culpable for failing to form that belief because, though the evidence available to him supports its formation, he chooses not to form it.36 Any such
claim presupposes that we have direct or synchronic freedom or control
over what we believe. But, truth be told, we have no such freedom or
control. We can't will to believe (or not). Beliefs just happen to us (or
not). We can of course do things to influence the beliefs we form.3 7 We
have some measure of indirect or diachronic freedom or control over our
beliefs, but reason is immune to the will's direct control. Reason, one
might say, has a mind of its own.
When an actor is ignorant of the law, we can in principle offer one of
three possible reasons to explain why. First, maybe he just didn't have
available to him evidence sufficient for him to form the belief that p.3 8 If
the available evidence sufficed, then second, maybe he lacked the cognitive powers necessary to form the belief that p. If he had the requisite
cognitive capacity, together with sufficient evidence, then third, maybe he
lacked the quality of will necessary to form the belief that p. Maybe his
ignorance was due, not to want of brainpower or evidence, but to the fact
that his will failed to manifest virtue, and in particular, what might be
called the virtue of law-abidance. We can thus trace an actor's failure to
form the belief that p to some defect or deficiency in the quality of his
evidence, the quality of his mind, or the quality of his will.
36. For a sampling of the extensive literature on so-called doxastic or epistemic volun-

tarism, see, for example, NIKOLAJ NOTTELMANN, BLAMEWORTHY BELIEF ch. 7 (2007);
BERNARD WILLIAMS, Deciding to Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136 (1973); William
Alston, The Deontological Concept of Epistemic Justification, 2 PHIL. PERSP. 257 (1988);
Andrew Chignell, The Ethics of Belief, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://

plato.stanford.edulentries/ethics-belief (last updated June 14, 2010); Neil Levy, Doxastic
Responsibility, 155 SYNTHESE 127 (2007). We can distinguish between an actor who
chooses to believe that p, when the evidence available to him does not support the formation of that belief, and an actor who chooses not to believe that p, when the evidence
available to him supports the formation of that belief. I'm concerned here with actors of
the latter sort, i.e., those who fail to form the belief that p when the evidence available to
them otherwise supports its formation.
37. Forming cognitive attitudes has thus been compared to vomiting or digesting. See
Andrei Bukareff, Compatibilism and Doxastic Control, 34 PHILOSOPHIA 143, 149 (2006)
(vomiting); Brian Weatherson, Deontology and Descartes' Demon, 105 J. PHIL. 540, 541
(2008) (digesting).
38. I rely here on a theory of evidence that derives from a theory of justified belief
known as evidentialism, according to which the only epistemic obligation under which we
labor is the obligation to form cognitive attitudes that fit our available evidence. See EARL
CONEE & RICHARD FELDMAN, Evidentialism, in EVIDENTIALISM: ESSAYS IN EPISTEMOL-

OGY 81, 81 (2004); Earl Conee & Richard Feldman, Evidence, in EPISTEMOLOGY: NEW

ESSAYS 83 (Quentin Smith ed., 2008); Earl Conee & Richard Feldman, Replies, in EVIDEN-

TIALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS (Trent Dougherty ed., 2011). 1 say nothing in defense of this

theory, nor do I try to explain what it means for one's evidence to support a particular

belief, or for a particular belief to be based on one's evidence. See generally Keith Allen
Korcz, The Epistemic Basing Relation, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, http://

plato.stanford.edulentries/basing-epistemic (last updated Jan. 21, 2010).
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QUALITY OF EVIDENCE

Sometimes an actor's failure to form the belief that p is due to the
simple fact that he lacked the evidence he needed to support its formation. He couldn't have formed the belief that p at t=1 because he lacked
the evidence needed to support its formation, even if he would have
formed it had he had such evidence.
One might nonetheless say that if such an evidence-deficient actor
chooses to p, he can nonetheless properly be called criminally to account
because he should have gathered whatever evidence he needed to support p's formation and failed to do so. According to this line of thought,
he was obligated at time t=1-n to gather the needed evidence, and his
failure to do so renders his choice to p at t=1 a choice made with a guilty
mind, despite the fact that he was at the time unaware of the fact that Ping was a crime. The actor's ignorance of p at t=1 provides no excuse, as it
otherwise would, because his ignorance was itself the product of his own
failure to act.
The general strategy here is familiar. 39 It locates an actor's guilty mind,
not at t=1, when the actor chooses to p, but at a prior point in time (t=1n), when he chooses to P, and his guilty mind at t=1-n is then deployed to
defeat his otherwise valid claim of ignorance at t=1. The simplest way for
the criminal law to implement a tracing strategy would be to enact forfeiture rules pursuant to which an actor who lacks a guilty mind at t=1 will
nonetheless be liable for the criminal wrong he unwittingly commits at
that time if his ignorance was the product of his choice to 3 at t=1-n,
where P describes some act or omission but for which the actor would not
39. The literature on moral responsibility commonly describes this line of thought as
involving "tracing." For discussions of tracing in the philosophical literature, see, for example, Holly Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 PHIL. REV. 543 (1983); Carl Ginet, The Epistemic
Requirements for Moral Responsibility, 34 Noos 267 (2000). The criminal-law literature
tends to describe this line of thought under the heading of "actio libera in causa" or "causing the conditions of one's own defense." See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of
One's Own Defense: A Study of the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 VA. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1985). The doctrine of actio libera in causa is different from what criminal lawyers sometimes call "time-framing." See Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship
Among Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. PHIL. &
POL'Y 84, 100 (1990).
Reliance on time-framing doesn't involve imputed culpability. It identifies the culpablycommitted act or omission at t=1-n to circumvent an exculpatory defense that would otherwise have defeated liability at t=1 if the relevant act or omission been portrayed as arising
at that later time. Reliance on actio libera in causa does involve imputed culpability. It
identifies a prior act or omission at t=1-n as a basis upon which to withdraw an otherwise
available exculpatory defense to a wrong committed at t=1 (and in that sense to impute
culpability for the subsequent wrong on the basis of the prior act or omission), at least
where at t=1-n the actor had some culpable mental state with respect to the fact that his act
or omission at that time would or might result in otherwise excusable wrongdoing at t=1.
See Moore & Hurd, supra note 28, at 177-80 (distinguishing between these two different
"tracing strategies"). How often or not we realize or should realize that what we do or not
at t=1-n will or might result in otherwise excusable wrongdoing at t=1 is a matter of debate.
Compare Manuel Vargas, The Trouble with Tracing, 29 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 269 (2005),

with John Martin Fischer & Neal Tagnazzini, The Truth About Tracing, 43 Nous 531
(2009), and Kevin Timpe, Tracingand the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility, 88
MODERN SCHOOLMAN 5 (2011).
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have been ignorant at t=1. The requisite act or omission P can describe a
particular act or omission resulting in the actor's ignorance of p at t=1, or
it can describe any act or omission creating an unjustified risk of such
ignorance. 40 Likewise, P might require the actor to realize that his act or
omission at t=1-n will or might result in his ignorance of p at t=1, or it
might impose strict liability with respect to that result.4 1 Whatever the
details, a tracing strategy is viable only under the following conditions or
limitations.
First, the fact that an actor P'ed would not alone support ascribing to
him a guilty mind and holding him accountable for p-ing if and when he
later chooses to (punaware of the fact that p-ing is a crime. He must in
addition realize at the time he chooses to P that P-ing is, if not itself a
crime, then at least a basis upon which, if he later chooses to q unaware
of the fact that p-ing is a crime, he will nonetheless be held criminally
accountable for p-ing. He must in other words choose to P with a guilty
mind. An actor cannot legitimately be subject to criminal liability unless
at some point in the story he has made a choice realizing that in so choosing he has done something that can render him vulnerable to criminal
liability. Without such a choice, he remains invulnerable. The state has no
standing to call him criminally to account.
Second, when an actor chooses to P with a guilty mind and as a result
chooses later to p without a guilty mind the state is free to hold him
accountable for both choices. The state is permitted to punish the actor,
not only for having P'ed with a guilty mind, but for having p'ed without a
guilty mind insofar the latter is the but-for and proximate result of the
former. Having said that, the punishment the state finally imposes on the
actor for having P'ed with a guilty mind and for having as a result p'ed
without a guilty mind must not be grossly disproportionate taking into
account the gravity of the act or omission P committed with a guilty mind
and the gravity of the wrong 9 arising from its commission. A state is free
to adopt whatever theory of punishment it wants, but it acts ultra vires if
the theory it embraces leads it to impose grossly disproportionate
punishments. 42

40. In the limiting case P might consist in the actor's failure to perform some mental
act that, had he performed it, would have resulted in the formation of the belief that p. For
example, one might say that the actor would have formed the belief that p if he had just
"stopped to think." The idea here seems to be that had the actor performed whatever
mental act or acts are involved in "just thinking" he would have formed this or that cognitive attitude, which in turn would have supplied additional evidence to his mind, which in
turn would have resulted in the formation of the belief that p.
41. For discussions of the various forms a tracing strategy might take, see Alexander,
supra note 39, at 102-04; Moore & Hurd, supra note 28, at 177-78.
42. I realize that more needs to be said about when a punishment is "grossly disproportionate." But what needs to be said will need to wait. Perhaps the idea might also, or
perhaps more honestly (if not any more determinately), be captured in the claim that punishment should not "shock the conscience" or should not "shock the conscience of a lawabiding citizen."
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QUALITY OF MIND

If the reason an actor failed to form the belief that p is not lack of
evidence, perhaps the problem lies instead with his quality of mind or
reason, in the cognitive machinery through which he forms beliefs. 4 3 At
the extreme we can imagine an actor lacking altogether the cognitive capacity to form the belief that p. Any evidence rationally supporting the
formation of the belief that p is warped and twisted in the actor's mind
such that p never forms. We'd be inclined to describe such an actor as
delusional. 44 He'd fit nicely into the M'Naughten mold of insanity, lacking
the capacity to tell legal right from legal wrong. 45 His failure to form the
belief that p was beyond his cognitive reach, not only in this world, but in
any nearby possible world in which his cognitive powers (such as they
are) remained fixed.
Sometimes an actor will fail to form the belief that p because his quality of mind or reason was limited in some way short of complete lack of
capacity. The nature or causes of such cognitive limitations are many,
ranging from relatively fixed and enduring mental diseases and defects,
like retardation, Alzheimer's, or other mental disorders, to relatively
temporary and transient impairments arising from intoxication, fatigue,
stress, and the like. The machinery through which such limited actors
form beliefs is not as powerful as it might be, and as a result, they fail to
form the belief that p when an otherwise similarly-situated actor with better machinery would have formed that belief. When a cognitively-compromised actor chooses to pin ignorance of the fact that p-ing is a crime,
and when his ignorance is the result of his diminished quality of mind, can
we ascribe to him a guilty mind in spite of his ignorance?
One could of course try to rely on the tracing strategy described above.
Imagine an actor who drinks too much and thereby diminishes his cognitive powers compared to what they would otherwise have been had he
been sober. 46 Now imagine he creates in his intoxicated state an unjustified risk of causing another's death. Indeed, the risk materializes and
43. The cognitive machinery through which we form beliefs is complex, as are the
corresponding defects that can diminish the quality or efficacy of that machinery. See
Moore & Hurd, supra note 28, at 167-68 (observing that cognitive shortcomings "are of a
vast and heterogeneous sort"); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 440 ("[Tlhe capacity for rationality is a congeries of skills,
including the ability to perceive accurately, to reason instrumentally according to minimally coherent preference-ordering, and to appreciate the significance of reasons and their
connection to our actions.").
44. What makes a "delusion" a "delusion" is controversial. See, e.g., LISA
BoRTOLOTTI, DELUSIONS AND OTHER IRRATIONAL BELIEFS 21-59 (2010); JENNIFER RADDEN, ON DELUSION (2010); Lisa Bortolotti, Delusion, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHI-

LOSOPHY, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/delusion (last updated Oct. 11, 2013).
45. The canonical language from M'Naughten's Case does not speak in terms of an
actor's lack of capacity to tell right from wrong. The test has nonetheless come to be associated with such incapacity.
46. Intoxication can of course have other effects on an actor's moral psychology. It can
compromise not only the quality of his mind, but the quality of his will too. See Douglas
Husak, Intoxication and Culpability, 6 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 363, 372 (2012) ("When intoxi-

cated defendants commit criminal acts that express insufficient concern for the interests of
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someone dies. Now imagine that the actor never realized he was creating
a risk of causing death because he was intoxicated (and thus never realized he was committing a crime). Does his ignorance excuse? Not under
existing law. 4 7 An actor who becomes voluntarily intoxicated, and thus
diminishes his cognitive powers, cannot escape responsibility because
those powers failed to work as they otherwise would have worked. His
ignorance won't excuse.
A state could choose to generalize this strategy. It could provide that
any actor who chooses to (p at t=1, but who fails at that time to realize
that 9-ing is a crime because he chose to P at t=1-n, which choice diminished his cognitive powers, will nonetheless be accountable for his choice
to p, despite so choosing without a guilty mind. Any such effort would of
course be permissible only insofar as it adhered to the conditions described above.
But what about actors whose cognitive limitations cannot plausibly be
traced back to a prior choice to P? What if their limitations are no fault of
their own? Responsibility for the cognitive impairments associated with
mental retardation, Alzheimer's, and other such disorders can hardly be
laid at the doorstep of those suffering them, nor can those suffering from
these and kindred impairments be held responsible when, as a result of
them, they fail to form the belief that p.
Or can they? One might say that if an actor fails to realize he's committing a crime when he chooses to p because the quality of his mind is
diminished, then too bad for him. If the quality of his mind was such that
he failed to form the belief that p, then (on this line of thought) his diminished powers of reason alone would warrant imputing to him a guilty
mind. No tracing needed. His diminished mind might of course mitigate
the measure of his guilt. Perhaps, for example, the state should offer him
a partial defense of diminished capacity.48 An actor who fails to form the
belief that p due to the diminished quality of his mind nonetheless expresses (on this line of thought) insufficient concern or regard for the law
and its ends, and as such, his choice to p displays a guilty mind despite the
fact that he had no idea that p-ing was a crime.
This line of thought is hard to swallow. Michael Moore and Heidi Hurd
put the point well: "[B]eing generically stupid is not a plausible vice, however undesirable such a characteristic might be." 4 9 I agree. I don't see
how one can ascribe a guilty mind to an actor who fails to form the belief
others, we know all we need to know about them to make the required inference to the
person we punish."). It can also compromise his powers of self-control.
47. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (1985).
48. If the law recognizes diminished capacity as a defense at all, it usually limits its
effect and scope insofar as it operates only to mitigate murder to manslaughter and affords
a defense only to murder. For an argument to the effect that the law should embrace a
generic partial defense of diminished capacity, see Stephen Morse, Diminished Rationality,
Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 289 (2003).
49. Moore & Hurd, supra note 28, at 170. The Model Penal Code apparently disagrees. See MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02

cmt. 4 (1985) ("[T]he ...

intelligence .

.

. of the

actor would not be held material in judging negligence."). For well-taken criticism of the
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that p just because his powers of mind were, through no fault of his own,
less than we and he might wish they were. Such an actor has a stupid
mind, not a guilty one. He deserves pity, not blame. He should regret any
criminal wrong he does in ignorance of its wrongfulness. He should apologize and make any needed material amends. But I can't see how his
choice to <p is one made with a guilty mind, and as such I can't see how
that choice can render him liable to the state's censure, let alone the suffering that turns censure into punishment.
C.

QUALITY OF WILL

If an actor's failure to form the belief that p arises neither from any
defect in the quality of his evidence nor from any defect in the quality of
his mind, the only remaining possibility is the quality of his will: the configuration of desires constituting his "will" at the moment of choice.50 An
actor might upon reflection identify with or endorse the quality of his
will, or he might reject it. Likewise, the quality of his will at any moment
might reflect the quality of his will over time, or it might not. The quality
of his will at any moment in time might thus be consistent with his character, or it might for some reason be out of character. But the fact that an
actor's quality of will at any moment in time possesses (or not) such synchronic or diachronic integrity or coherence doesn't matter to the quality
of his will at that moment.51 At any point in time, the quality of an actor's
will is what it is.
We can readily understand how the quality of an actor's mind can
thwart the formation of the belief that p, but how can the quality of his
will do likewise? The answer lies in the power of desire to move the mind
to work in mysterious ways. Desire can distort how the actor's reason
interprets the available evidence or how it tests hypotheses. It can shift
the actor's attention such that some evidence becomes salient, entering
the limelight of reason, while other evidence recedes into the shadows. 52
When desire thus influences the workings of reason, an actor can end up
seeing the world in ways he would otherwise not. Reason is most apt to
Code on this point, see Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal
Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137, 149 (2008).

50. What I have in mind can be described in various ways, e.g., an actor's "configuration of desires and aversions," his "overall motivational structure," his "overall evaluative
attitudes," and so forth. See Smith, supra note 6, at 127, 138, 141.
51. A state might nonetheless decide, for example, that an actor who chooses to P with
an ill will and who identifies with his will so constituted has a mind more guilty than one
who is alienated from it. The state might likewise decide that an actor who chooses to p
with an ill will and whose will is characteristically ill chooses with a mind more guilty than
one whose will is not characteristically ill. See Sarah Buss, Autonomous Action: Self-Determination in the Passive Mode, 122 ETHICS 647, 658-59 (2012).
52. See generally DELUSION AND SELF-DECEFTION: AFFECTIVE AND MOTIVATIONAL
INFLUENCES ON BELIEF FORMATION (Tim Bayne & Jori Fernindez eds., 2008). The process

I have in mind is associated with so-called "hot" (i.e., motivated) biases in contrast to socalled "cold" (i.e., non-motivated) heuristics and biases, which I consider part of our (limited) cognitive machinery.
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discover the truth when the only desire at work is the desire for the truth.
When other desires move the mind, reason can be led astray.
When an actor chooses to (p unaware that (p-ing is a crime, his ignorance ordinarily undercuts the ascription of a guilty mind. We've seen
that one possible way to hold an actor accountable for choosing to P,
despite the fact that his choice was made without a guilty mind is to trace
his guilt-free commission of 9 back to his guilty commission of 3. Set that
possibility aside for now. We've also seen that the state cannot ascribe a
guilty mind to an actor whose ignorance arises from some defect in the
quality of his mind. But can the state ascribe a guilty mind when an actor's ignorance arises from a defect in the quality of his will, i.e., when the
quality of his will precludes the formation of the belief that p?
Yes, at least sometimes.5 3 Consider an actor whose quality of will fails
to conform to that of a law-abiding citizen. A law-abiding citizen embodies the virtue of law-abidance inasmuch as the quality of his will consistently displays or manifests sufficient concern or respect for the law and its
ends.5 4 Our imagined actor's will, in contrast, displays or manifests a reprehensible lack of such concern or respect. Compared to the law-abiding
citizen, he cares too much for his own ends or too little for the law's.
When the quality of such an actor's will prevents him from forming the
belief that p, the actor's choice to T manifests a guilty mind, even though
he never realized he was crossing the line into criminality. His mind's
guilt is manifest, not in any choice to defy the law's demands, since he's
made no such choice, but in his failure, as a result of ill will, to appreciate
53. In the philosophical literature on moral responsibility, those who believe likewise
are sometimes called "attributionists." See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME ch. 4 (2008); T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE EACH
OTHER ch. 6 (1998); Pamela Hieronymi, Responsibility for Believing, 161 SYNTHESE 357
(2008); Angela Smith, Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment, 138 PHIL. STUD. 367
(2008); Angela Smith, Responsibilityfor Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life, 115
ETHIcs 236 (2005) [hereinafter Smith, Responsibility for Attitudes]. In the criminal-law
literature, a similar position is held among those who argue that an actor should be regarded as negligent if his failure to perceive a risk he is creating or imposing results from
indifference to the well-being of others, or in other words, if he would have perceived a
risk he was creating or imposing had he not been indifferent to the well-being of others.
See, e.g., R.A. Dun', ANSWERING FOR CRIME 296 (2007); MAYO MORAN, RETHINKING
THE REASONABLE PERSON: AN EGALITARIAN RECONSTRUCTION OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 273 (2003); Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory: The Problem of
Criminal Negligence, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 365, 388 (1994); Westen, supra note 49,
at 151. 1 read Dan Kahan to be making a similar point. See Kahan, supra note 21, at 130
("[A] person is rightly condemned as a criminal wrongdoer not only for knowingly choosing to violate the law, but also for exhibiting the kind of character failing associated with
insufficient commitment to the moral norms embedded in the community's criminal law.").
54. My description of the virtue of law-abidance is admittedly pretty vague and bareboned. What, more precisely, does it mean to say that a law-abiding citizen has sufficient
concern or regard for the law and its ends? For helpful and extended discussion of the
virtue of law-abidance, which may or may not be consistent with the way in which I deploy
the idea here, see William A. Edmundson, The Virtue of Law-Abidance, 6 PHILOSOPHERS'
IMPRINT 1 (2006). Peter Westen's account of the "reasonable person" seems close to what I
have in mind. See Westen, supra note 49, at 160 (A "reasonable person . . .consists of every
physical, psychological, and emotional trait an actor possesses, with one exception-the
exception being that he possesses proper respect for the values of the people of the state as
reflected and incorporated in the statute at hand.").
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the law's demands in the first place. If the criminal law calls such an actor
to account, it does so not for any ill will he expresses in choosing to defy
the law's demands, but for the ill will he expresses in being blind to those
demands in the first place.5 5
Perhaps the most powerful reply to this line of thought comes from
those who insist that we can be called to account only for that over which
our will qua executive capacity has direct control. 56 We have such control
over the intentions we choose to form, as well as the special intentions
called volitions that translate our intentions into actions. But we lack such
direct control over our beliefs and the qualities of mind and will upon
which their formation depends. We cannot at any moment in time choose
the content or quality of our minds or wills. They are what they are. The
state can therefore ascribe to us a guilty mind if and when we choose
through the exercise of our will to p, realizing that in so choosing, we are
committing a crime, but it cannot do so when we choose to p without
realizing that we are entering criminal territory. Ignorance undermines
any effort to underwrite a guilty mind, save where such ignorance can be
traced to a prior guilty-minded choice.57 No control, no guilty mind.
We shouldn't dismiss this objection lightly, but neither should we regard as self-evident the premise from which it proceeds. We often call to
account in one way or another those who've wronged us, even when we
realize the wrongdoer didn't realize he was doing anything wrong, at least
when we suspect that his ignorance was due to the fact that he just didn't,
so to speak, give a damn: when his ignorance was due to a quality of will
defective in its lack of concern for others. Moreover, we regard ourselves
as perfectly justified in calling such unwitting wrongdoers to account.
Shouldn't the same go for the state? Shouldn't the state be permitted to
call to account those who unwittingly wrong it, as long as their ignorance
arises from a quality of will unbecoming a law-abiding citizen? If so, then
perhaps responsibility can exist without control.
Which side has it right? Does the guilty mind consist only in choosing
to p where that choice is made with the realization that p-ing is a crime?
Or does it also consist in the choice to p where that choice is made in
ignorance, itself the product of an ill will? We shouldn't expect to reach
consensus. The answer after all involves drawing the metaphysical bound55. In language likely to be more familiar to criminal lawyers, I'd say that an actor's
ignorance of the law should be an excuse, unless we can characterize his ignorance as
"unreasonable," and we should only characterize his ignorance as "unreasonable" if he
would have formed the belief that p but for the fact that the quality of his will at t=1 failed
to conform to that of a law-abiding citizen.
56. What it means to say that an actor has "control" over this or that, or to say that
this or that is immune or vulnerable to "luck," is more complicated that it might at first
appear. Having said that, I hope the argument made in the text can for now do without an
extended inquiry into the meaning or meanings we can attach to the concept of "control."
For a helpful description of the conceptual landscape, see generally Michael J. Zimmerman, Moral Luck: A Partial Map, 36 CAN. J. PHIL. 585, 590-94 (2006).
57. For example, if he has diminished the force of countervailing desires as a result of
self-induced intoxication. See Husak, supra note 46, at 373 ("[I]ntoxication frequently alters the degree of care we exhibit for the interests of others.").
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aries of the responsible self.58 Can we bear responsibility for the wrongs
we choose to do only if we realize we are choosing to do wrong? Is the
responsible self confined to the will qua executive capacity? Or can we
also bear responsibility for the quality of our will, at least when the quality of our will is ill and blinds us to the wrong we do? Does the responsible self also include the will qua conative capacity?
Insofar as my aim here is to describe the threshold or minimal conditions necessary for the ascription of a guilty mind, I'm presently inclined
to believe that when an actor chooses to p but does so unaware of the fact
that he is committing a crime, the state can fairly ascribe to him a guilty
mind, despite his ignorance, if his ignorance itself arises from an ill will. 5 9
A state could of course choose to impose additional limits on when it will
ascribe a guilty mind. It could choose, for example, to ascribe a guilty
mind only to actors who choose to p realizing that p-ing is a crime. But it
remains within the bounds of its authority if it chooses instead to include
among the guilty-minded those whose choice to p is made in ignorance,
itself resulting from an ill will.
Now, some cases in which an actor fails to form the belief that p may
appear to be cases in which the actor's ignorance results from an ill will,
but appearances can sometimes be deceiving. The quality of an actor's
will consists, as I've said, in the configuration of desires influencing at any
given moment the way in which the actor's mind forms beliefs based on
the evidence available to him at that moment, and sometimes, as I've
said, those desires can preclude the formation of the belief that p. Yet
sometimes an actor's ignorance results not from the net effect of the
desires constituting his will but from the undue influence of a single de58. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundariesof the Self, 105 HARV. L.
959, 961 (1992) (describing a "constitutive paradigm" of responsibility that "enables
us to reinterpret disputes about the ascription of responsibility as reflecting the plasticity of
the self and as involving a negotiation over the self's relevant boundaries"); Smith, Responsibility for Attitudes, supra note 53, at 263 (arguing that attributionism "gives us a satisfying
account of the boundaries of the moral self . . .. [and that t]heories [of responsibility that]
make choice or voluntary control a precondition of moral responsibility . . . leave us with
an impoverished conception of moral personhood.").
59. This claim presupposes that an actor is responsible for the quality of his will. If one
asked why that should be so, one answer would be that we are responsible for the quality
of our wills because we just are our wills. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME 569
(1997); Dan-Cohen, supra note 58, at 974. Drawing inspiration from the so-called manipuREV.

lation argument, see, e.g., ISHTIYAQUE HAJI, INCOMPATIBILISM's ALLURE 119-20 (2009)

(formulating the argument), some philosophers (sometimes called source incompatibilists)
nonetheless insist that determinism undermines the proposition that we are responsible for
the quality of our wills, and as such, no one is responsible for the quality of his will, nor for
his acts or omissions. See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL (2001). The

debate between those who claim we can be responsible for the quality of our wills and
those who claim otherwise focuses on which, if any, historical causes but for which the
quality of one's will would be otherwise than it is undermine one's responsibility for the
quality of one's will, and which do not. Some maintain that responsibility for who we are
and what we do is or can be vulnerable to the vagaries of one's history, while others maintain that the historical story behind who we are and what we do is (more or less) neither
here nor there. A full defense of the position I describe in the text would need to defend
the claim that we can be responsible for the quality of our will, but that defense will need
to wait for another occasion.
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sire (or some sufficiently small subset of desires). If so, it would be a
mistake to attribute to him an ill will when in ignorance he chooses to <p.
The culprit in such cases is not the actor's will. The culprit is a part of his
will, and a part doesn't fairly reflect the whole.60
Let me try to describe two such cases: one involving what might be
called a rogue desire, the other what might be called a pathologicaldesire.
In both cases, a single desire manages to capture the actor's reason, focusing its light on some of the evidence available to the actor, while casting other evidence into darkness. As a result countervailing desires never
have their day in reason's court. They never get the chance to direct the
actor's reason to evidence that would have lead the actor to realize that
(p-ing was a crime.
Consider so-called rogue desires. Suppose an actor fails to form the
belief that p, not as a result of the quality of his will, but as a result of a
single desire that somehow succeeds in commandeering the actor's reason, focusing or directing it such that some of the evidence presently
available to the actor becomes salient and other evidence obscured. This
single desire for some reason manages to exercise its influence without
any countervailing desires managing to exercise their influence in the opposite direction. As a result, the actor fails to form the belief that p. The
actor's failure to realize he is committing a crime thus reflects the work of
a single rogue desire, not the quality of his will as such. His ignorance
tells us something about the actor, but it doesn't tell the full story, which
is the story we need in order to impute to him a guilty mind when he
chooses to qp unaware of the fact that in so doing he is entering criminally
forbidden territory. 6 1
A metaphor might help. Imagine a stage, and imagine the forthcoming
performance includes many different actors. Now imagine that one member of the ensemble darts out on stage and starts a soliloquy telling the
60. See Smith, supra note 6, at 140 (arguing that an actor is blameworthy for a "bad,"
"non-voluntary response" to a "situation" just in case that response arises "solely" from
the actor's "desires and aversions" and those desires and aversions "represent a sufficiently
complete set of [the actor's] desires and aversions which are relevant to [the] situation").
How can we tell whether or not an actor's ignorance is the result of a rogue desire? All else
being equal, an actor's ignorance is less likely to have been just the result of a rogue desire
if the actor characteristically or routinely fails to form the belief that p when the evidence
otherwise supports its formation, or if the actor's failure to form the belief that p is part of
a pattern of such failures. See Levy, supra note 6, at 252-53. One might also ask a
counterfactual question: Would the actor have chosen to p if he realized that (p-ing was
criminal? See Smith, supra note 6, at 143-44. If yes, then all else being equal, the actor's
ignorance is again less likely to have been just the result of a rogue desire.
61. An analogy can, I think, be drawn here to cases involving actors who commit
crimes while asleep, unconscious or hypnotized. Such cases are commonly thought to be
cases in which the criminal law's voluntary act requirement is unsatisfied, not because the
actor's body moves in the absence of volition or volition-like states causing that movement,
but because, as Michael Moore has put it, "[c]onsciousness seems essential as part of our
self-boundaries, so that if we (our conscious selves) are asleep or are otherwise not active,
then we don't will anything-even if volition-like states execute certain of our background
states of desire, belief, and general intention." MICHAEL MOORE, Acr AND CRIME: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAw 257 (1993) (emphasis
in original).
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audience to direct its attention this way or that. The audience naturally
does as the rouge performer directs. A rogue desire is like the rogue performer, and reason is like the audience. The rogue performer steals the
attention of the audience much as a rogue desire steals the attention of
the actor's reason. What the audience sees under the influence of the
rogue performer is not what it would have seen had the entire cast of
performers been on stage. Likewise, what reason sees under the influence
of a rouge desire is not what it would have seen had the actor's entire cast
of desires taken to the stage of his mind.
Next, consider so-called pathological desires. Here the problem is not
so much that a single desire manages to commandeer the actor's reason
without other desires managing even to make it on stage. The problem is
that a single desire manages to command the attention of the actor's reasons inasmuch as it drowns out any effect the actor's other desires might
otherwise have had. It succeeds in overwhelming or silencing them such
that, once again, the actor's reason attends only to that which a single
desire directs its attention. A single desire has once again assumed an
outsized role in the actor's psyche such that the actor's failure to form the
belief that p reflects not so much the quality of his will as it does the
undue influence of a solo desire.
But what kind of desire could have such influence? An unsatisfied desire can cause disappointment, dismay, sadness, anxiety, and so forth. But
it sometimes does more. It sometimes causes pain. Not just any old pain,
but unremitting, intense, hegemonic pain. 62 Once in the grip of such pain,
one can think of nothing else. 6 3 We might imagine that only so-called
"abnormal" desires associated with paraphilias or phobias, or perhaps
those associated with addiction, can cause such pain. Perhaps, but it
seems to me that any desire causing such pain deserves for that reason to
be called pathological, 64 and when such a desire takes command of an
actor's reason and causes him to fail to form the belief that p, it would be
a mistake to ascribe to him a guilty mind. A pathological part of his will
62. See Buss, supra note 51, at 662 (observing that "'clinical depression' is far more
debilitating than the 'depression' of one who feels 'low' or 'down in the dumps' . . . largely,
if not entirely, because the former condition is more unremitting, more intense, more hegemonic"). Pain of this sort is not just something one takes into account in forming one's
beliefs or deciding what to do: it determines what one takes into account in the first place.
See id. at 670. How much pain must an unrequited desire cause before it deserves to be
labeled "pathological"? A bright line here would be nice, but alas, none is to be had. See
id. at 675 ("[T]here is no determinate, specifiable point at which a 'personality trait' becomes just extreme enough to qualify as a trait of 'pathology.'")
63. See id. at 667 ("Sickness is like a hostile takeover in which the part of your mind
which hurts manages completely to dominate and silence the rest of you.") (quoting WILFRED SHEED, IN LOVE WiTH DAYLIGHT: A MEMOIR OF RECOVERY 21 (1995)).
64. See Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1634
(1994).
Although I am sympathetic to claim that the rationality of desires or ends is difficult to
assess, I am finally convinced, by malignantly circular reasoning perhaps, that it must be
irrational to want to produce unjustified harm so intensely that failure to satisfy that desire
will create sufficient dysphoria to warrant an excuse.
Id.
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has produced his ignorance, but a pathological part of an actor's will isn't
really part of his will at all. 6 5
Return to the stage metaphor. Unlike a rogue desire, which rushes to
take to the stage alone, leaving the other performers in the wings, a pathological desire is one that takes to the stage along with all the other performers in the show. Nonetheless, unlike the other performers with
whom he shares the stage, a pathological performer appears, not with a
microphone in hand, but with a bullhorn. He delivers what's in effect a
soliloquy, drowning out anything the other performers might have to say,
and as a result the audience hears nothing else. Likewise, when a pathological desire takes to the stage, the pain it produces when left unsatisfied
leaves the actor's reason attending to nothing else. The pathological desire prevents the actor's reason from acknowledging evidence that would
otherwise have produced the belief that p.
Let me now switch gears to make a final point. I've proposed that the
state is free to ascribe a guilty mind to an actor whose choice to <pis done
in ignorance of the fact that p, provided the actor's ignorance reflects an
ill will (and not just the malign effect of a rouge or pathological desire).
Such an actor is criminally liable in the eyes of the state. But being criminally liable is one thing. Holding such an actor liable is another. 66 What
does it mean for the state to hold an actor criminally liable? What options
does a state have when it decides to hold liable an actor who has chosen
to <p with a guilty mind and thereby rendered himself liable to be so held?
The first thought that comes to mind when we ask how a state holds
someone criminally liable is punishment. Saying that an actor is criminal
liable is commonly understood to mean that the state is morally permitted to impose on him some form of punishment. Nonetheless, criminal
liability need not be understood as liability to punishment, and indeed, it
shouldn't be so understood when an actor chooses to <p without forming
the belief that p, and where the ascription of a guilty mind therefore rests
on the fact that he failed to form that belief as a result of ill will.
Punishment is conventionally, if not uncontroversially, 67 understood as
65. See Buss, supra note 51, at 660 ("[T]here is an important respect in which even
well-integrated, long-standing psychological and physiological conditions are external to a
human agent's identity insofar as they are causes or symptoms of human malfunctioning.");
id. at 668 (Sickness "is an attack on a person by something external to the human being she
truly is.") (emphasis added).
66. See, e.g., Angela M. Smith, On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible, 11 J.
ErHics 465, 467 (2007) (arguing that "we must be very careful about drawing any conclusions about a person's responsibility and culpability for a thing from our intuitions about
whether and when it would be appropriate for a particular person to 'hold' her responsible
for that thing."). For a response to Smith and defense of the position associated most
prominently with P.F. Strawson and R. Jay Wallace (according to which the norms of appropriate holding are taken to be constitutive of being responsible), see Chauncey Maher,
On Being and Holding Responsible, 12 PHIL. EXPLORATIONs 129 (2010).
67. Recent challenges come from Vincent Chiao, Punishment and Permissibility in the
CriminalLaw, 32 LAW & PHIL. 729 (2013), and Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment,
18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012). Both challenges presently strike me as efforts aimed (not
without reason) at conceptual revision rather than conceptual analysis.
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the intentional infliction of some hardship, burden, suffering, and so forth
on a culpable wrongdoer for the wrong he culpably committed with the
intent thereby to censure or condemn him for that culpably-committed
wrong. So understood punishment has two parts: hardship and condemnation. But we can easily separate the hardship associated with punishment from the condemnation associated with it. The state can express
censure or condemnation in the form of a criminal conviction without
imposing any (additional) hardship or suffering. 68 Criminal liability necessarily renders an actor liable to a judgment of conviction, but it needn't
also render him liable to punishment. Indeed, efforts to justify punishment are efforts to justify, not condemnation or censure, but the hardship
or suffering that when added to condemnation or censure produce
punishment.
When an actor chooses to (pwithout realizing that q-ing is a crime, and
when his failure to so realize is due to ill will, he has thereby rendered
himself liable to the state's censure, but has he also rendered himself liable to its punishment? I don't think so.
The quality of will he reveals in his choice to T warrants some response,
but insofar as he chooses to p without being aware that p-ing is a crime,
he hasn't defied the law. He hasn't chosen to p realizing that the law
demands that he not so choose. If he had been aware he might of course
have chosen to defy the law, but the fact remains he wasn't aware and
didn't so choose. The extent to which the state can hold him to account
should thus be limited to the expression of censure. 69 The state can convict and thereby condemn an actor for choosing to p with a guilty-butunwitting mind, but it can convict and punish him only when he chooses
to (pwith a guilty-and-witting one. Punishment should be7 0limited to those
whose disregard for the law takes the form of defiance.
68. The state can also do the reverse. It can impose hardship without condemnation, in
which case we should call the hardship something other than punishment. See, e.g., Joel
Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIsT 397, 398 (1965) (characterizing such impositions as "penalties").
69. How might this proposal play out in the real world? I imagine something like this.
The actor is charged with p-ing. He interposes a defense based on reasonable ignorance of
the law (as herein understood). The jury would be asked specifically to accept or reject the
defense. If the defense is accepted, the defendant is acquitted. If the defense is rejected, the
jury would have to say why. If it was rejected because the defendant realized he was doing
something criminal, then the defendant would be convicted of p-ing and would thereby
become liable to punishment. If it was rejected because the defendant didn't realize he was
doing something criminal, but failed to so realize due to ill will, then he would be convicted
of p-ing but would only be liable to censure.
70. More needs to be said here about why the state's response to the defiant can involve punishment, while its response to the non-defiant must be limited to censure. My
sense is that imposing the hardship or burden or whatnot associated with punishment is
simply unfair unless the actor has had a fair opportunity to avoid it, and he's had no such
opportunity unless he realized he was doing something to put himself at risk of being on
the receiving end of such hard treatment. In any event, the claims made in the text presuppose that wrongful actions performed in ignorance of the fact that p, provided the actor's
ignorance arises from ill will, are sufficient to warrant the ascription of a guilty mind, a
judgment that the actor is blameworthy, and the expression of that judgment in the form of
a criminal conviction. Moreover, when the state convicts such an actor and thereby ex-
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One might object that a liberal state worthy of the name cannot countenance the censure, let alone the punishment, of an actor for the quality
of his will, ill or otherwise. 7 ' It cannot countenance censuring, let alone
punishing, an actor who chooses to p unaware of the fact that p-ing is a
crime even when his ignorance results from ill will, because doing so
would in reality amount to punishing him for being who he was at the
moment he so chose, inasmuch as he just was his will at that moment. A
liberal state, the objection continues, can only censure or punish its citizens for what they choose to do or what they choose not to do, but it
cannot censure or punish them for who they are. It can censure and punish its citizens for the choices they make, but not for the quality of their
wills, no matter how ill those wills might have been.
But an actor who chooses to p and whose ill will renders him ignorant
of p's status as a crime is not being censured just because the quality of
his will failed to synch with that of a law-abiding citizen. A state should
indeed have its liberal credentials confiscated if it punished, or even only
censured, its citizens just because the quality of their wills at any particular moment happened not to manifest the virtue of law-abidance. An ill
will alone doesn't give a liberal state permission to condemn, let alone
punish. But an actor who chooses to 9 in ignorance of the fact that (p-ing
is a crime, and whose ignorance arises from ill will, is not vulnerable to
state censure just because he lacks virtue, just because his ignorance
arises from an ill will. He becomes thus vulnerable only when he chooses
to p, albeit a choice made in ignorance of the fact that p-ing is a crime.
But this reply gives rise to another objection. Consider two actors A
and B. Assume that A's will and B's will at time t are both equally ill. As
it happens B never finds himself in circumstances in which he chooses to
p having been blinded as a result of his ill will to the fact that 9-ing is a
crime. Lucky B. A isn't so lucky. He finds himself in circumstances in
which his ill will does indeed blind him to the fact that p-ing is a crime
and he chooses to (pin blissful ignorance of that fact. A and B are equally
lacking in virtue. Both possess an ill will. Yet only A finds himself convicted and condemned for the ill quality of his will, and he find himself in
that predicament only because he was unlucky enough to have found
himself in circumstances in which his ill will blinded him to the fact that
p-ing was a crime. Criminal liability, one might say, should be immune
from luck, at least from such circumstantial luck. Thus, if the state cannot
punish B, then neither can it punish A, because the only thing separating
them is luck.
Some theorists insist that luck should indeed be irrelevant to the criminal law. Lotteries should have no place in the distribution of punishment.
presses censure, its expression should not be understood as consisting in (merely) the expression of an aretaic judgment, but in the expression of blameworthiness.
71. See Moore & Hurd, supra note 28, at 173 (arguing that "punishing people for bad
character (either directly or indirectly by punishing people for harms that are the product

of character-related inadvertence) . . . [is] incompatibl[e] . . . with the philosophical tradi-

tion of political liberalism to which American law generally pays homage.").
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The criminal law should thus be structured in such a way that criminal
liability is immune to luck. Others believe that the influence of luck cannot be expunged from the criminal law, and as such, the criminal law
needs to make peace with luck. Criminal liability needn't be immune to
luck because it can't be. But luck's role in the criminal law is one on
which reasonable minds notoriously disagree. 72 In what does luck consist? Can a criminal law be written in which criminal liability depends in
no way on luck? If it can be, should it be? Good questions, and disagreement on how to answer them is likely to persist. Yet such persistent disagreement and the need to settle it, however provisionally and tentatively,
is the good we gain from having a state vested with authority.
If so, then the state gets to decide what role luck will play when it turns
its attention to A. Perhaps the state will decide that luck should have no
role, and that if it cannot punish B just because he had an ill will, then
neither can it punish A just because he was unlucky enough to find himself in a situation in which his ill will blinded him to tp's criminality. But
the state might decide otherwise. It might decide that luck isn't irrelevant.
It might decide that A's ill will, together with his choice to 9, suffices to
render him liable to its censure, and if it does so decide, it can keep its
liberal credentials. It will not have censured A just for the quality of his
will. It will have censured A for the choice he made to p, albeit a choice
made in ignorance resulting from ill will.
V.

CONCLUSION

Deep within the criminal law rest two time-honored Latin maxims. The
first we know as actus non facit reum nisi mens rea. I've suggested that we
should understand this maxim as a limit on the state's authority to subject
its citizen to criminal liability in whatever form. It bans the state from
censuring, let alone punishing, those who choose to commit a crime unless in so doing they manifest mens rea, or a guilty mind, understood as
an insufficient regard for the criminal law and its ends, or what in an
older lexicon might have been described as a vicious or ill will.
The second we know as ignoratia legis neminem excusat. I've suggested
that this maxim, at least as commonly understood, conflicts with the first,
and that the mens rea maxim should prevail. Despite its longevity the
ignoratio maxim is misguided. Ignorance of the law does excuse. Except
when the actor's ignorance can be traced to a prior breach itself committed with a guilty mind, or when his ignorance itself manifests the ill will
that marks the presence of a guilty mind, ignorance of the law entails the
absence of mens rea. Ignoratia legis excusat.

72. For a recent entry in the ever-ongoing debate, see, for example, Kenneth Einar
Himma, If You Ain't in Prison, You Just Got Lucky: Luck, Culpability, and the Retributivist Justification of Punishment, 1 JURISPRUDENTIA (forthcoming 2014).
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